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 Resumo 
Estudamos o impacto do referendo do Brexit em empresas transacionadas na 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) através da análise de mudanças de certas 
características das suas narrativas financeiras nomeadamente, o tom, a incerteza, 
o forward–looking e a causalidade. Usando vários modelos de regressão linear, 
realizamos uma análise das características referidas a diferentes secções do 
relatório de gestão (Management Discussion and Analysis – MD&A –, mensagem 
do Chairman e mensagem do CEO). 
Enquanto o tom não é explicado pelo referendo, as palavras de incerteza, de 
forward-looking e de causalidade tornam-se mais frequentes após o voto. 
Os resultados mostram que as empresas reagiram ao referendo do Brexit e 
alteraram o seu discurso em consequência do resultado do voto. 
Palavras–chave: Referendo do Brexit, Natural Language Processing, tom, 
incerteza, forward–looking, causalidade, empresas financeiras e não financeiras. 
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Abstract 
We study the impact of the Brexit referendum on firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) by analysing the changes in some characteristics of their 
financial narratives, namely, tone, uncertainty, forward–looking and causal 
language. Using a multivariate model, we analyse these features on different 
sections of the management report (e.g. Management Discussion and Analysis, 
Chairman message and CEO message). 
While tone is not explained by the referendum, uncertainty, forward-looking 
and causal words become more frequent after the vote.  
Our results confirm companies reacted to the Brexit referendum and change 
their discourse as a consequence of the vote outcome.  
Keywords: Brexit referendum, Natural Language Processing, tone, 
uncertainty, forward–looking, causality, financial and non–financial firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) can be defined as a “discourse analysis 
technique” and refers to automated methods used to process information from 
text collections (Xing, Cambria and Welsch, 2017). Through its application, it is 
possible to extract discourse characteristics, such as sentiment (or tone), 
complexity and readability.  
Research on Accounting and Finance suggests that firm sentiment can be a 
predictor for earnings and stock returns (Bannier, Pauls and Walter, 2017; Price 
et al, 2012) or a proxy for firm performance (Smith and Taffler, 2000), reflecting 
not only current performance, but also, expectations towards the future. 
However, tone has been shown to be used as a mechanism to manipulate 
investors’ perception of performance (Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2011). In 
addition, it has been documented that firms with lower earnings increase 
complexity, making discourse harder to understand as an attempt to difficult the 
process of analysing information. Furthermore, profitable firms with persistent 
earnings have lower complexity (Li, 2008). 
Hence, tone and complexity are correlated with firm performance and can be 
used to more accurately analyse a company’s financial condition. Note that, the 
association between performance and tone can be used to analyse if a firm is 
looking to inform the market or engaging in perception manipulation.  
Sentiment based research can be applied to different corporate disclosure 
vehicles, from conference calls and earnings press releases to annual reports. In 
this thesis, we focus on the Chairman’s, the CEO’s and Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A) sections of the annual report1. The study of these sections 
                                                 
1 Alves et al. (2016) showed that different annual report sections carry different performance predictive 
ability. Given that, we conduct an analysis tone, uncertainty discourse, forward–looking speech and causal 
reasoning across different annual report sections.   
 2 
is complementary to the Financial Statements’ analysis (Karthik, Li and Yang, 
2012), as investors are unable to fully analyse a company’s financial performance 
by looking only to quantitative information (Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2011). 
Interest on the information that firm sentiment captures is increasing, which 
is evident in the growing importance of the narratives’ sections both in terms of 
Accounting and Finance research (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) but also in each 
firm’s annual report.  Lewis and Young (2019) showed that the median report 
size – measured by the number of words – grew by 122%2, and the number of 
topics in the median table of contents of UK reports, related to the narratives 
sections was 50% higher from 2003 to 2016, considering a sample of 19,426 annual 
reports (3,252 firms). 
We use the dataset3 generated by the CFIE–FRSE4 software which classifies 
annual report sections and extracts sentiment based on different lists of words 
developed for Accounting and Finance research. Using a sample of 6,821 annual 
reports (2,296 from financial firms and 4,525 from non–financial companies) from 
2012 to 2017, we study the narratives tone – here defined as the number of 
positive words minus the negative ones, scaled by their sum –, but also, 
uncertainty, forward–looking and causality language. Positive and negative 
words are defined according to the list of words proposed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011). Uncertainty is proxied with words that capture imprecision 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Forward–looking words are the ones related 
with forecasts (Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003). Causal language is 
associated with words firms use to justify or explain something, such as 
performance or an event that affected it (Zhang and Aerts, 2015). Koonce, Seybert 
and Smith (2011) stated that causal language is a central dimension on financial 
                                                 
2 This growth can be explained by the mandatory adoption of the IFRS in 2005 (Lewis and Young, 2019). 
3 The dataset is available for download at http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/datasets/uk-annual-report-
narratives-dataset-cfiefrse-may-2019(4443e5bd-38c4-45bf-ae96-a7d947e529ce).html  
4 The software is available for download at https://drelhaj.github.io/CFIE-FRSE/.  
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and voluntary report. However, there is a major gap on research on uncertainty, 
forward–looking and causal language in Accounting and Finance. We plan to 
contribute to the literature by studying these sentiments around an event that 
may influence companies’ performance and, consequently, discourse. The Brexit 
referendum is an example of such event. We believe it will impact the discourse 
applied in each company’s financial narratives.  
The Brexit referendum had a major impact for the economy of the United 
Kingdom as the market fail to anticipate the outcome of the vote.  Results to leave 
the European Union (EU) won by 51.9% 5 . Studies show this result created 
uncertainty (Bloom, 2019), it reduced companies’ abnormal returns (Oehler, 
Horn and Wendt, 2017; Ramiah et al, 2017) and is expected to reduce the UK’s 
long–term GDP growth rate (Dhingra et al, 2017; OECD, 2016; PwC, 2016). 
Having in account these effects and work on firm sentiment, we test whether 
firms’ discourse changes as a consequence of the vote. We expect tone to become 
more negative (to decrease) and uncertainty, forward–looking and causal words 
to be more recurrent in the annual reports published in 2016 and 2017.  
Our results show the vote does not affect tone. Uncertainty, forward-looking 
and causal words, on the contrary, become more frequent, which means the 
financial narratives incorporated the uncertainty created by the Brexit 
referendum.  
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of the Brexit referendum have not yet 
been quantified using computational linguistics. We add a different perspective 
to analyse the effects of the vote. Moreover, we contribute to Accounting and 
Finance literature by conducting an analysis across annual report sections and by 
studying different sentiments. Furthermore, we add to the work on automated 
content analysis, a study applied to a non–US country, the UK. Work on these 
                                                 
5 See https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/whowe-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-
referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/results-and-turnout-eu-referendum 
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matters shows there are many obstacles to the application of computational 
linguistics to non–US countries, mainly due to disclosure regulation.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 regards the 
literature review presenting a theoretical framework on financial narratives and 
the Brexit referendum. Chapter 3 is the methodology, where we describe the 
process of sample selection and variables included in the models. Chapter 4 
presents and discusses the results. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.  
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2. Literature review 
As mentioned above we study the impact of the Brexit referendum through the 
application of computational linguistics. Therefore, we start the literature 
review by explaining the process used to extract tone from text collections and 
then, how it is applied to study the impact of the Brexit referendum. 
 
2.1. Automated content analysis  
The use of automated content analysis for Accounting and Finance discourse 
or as stated by Loughran and McDonald (2016) “the notion of parsing text for 
patterns has a long history”.  
Computational linguistics, automated content analysis or Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) are commonly used across disciplines as aliases and refer to 
similar textual analysis approaches (Loughran and McDonald, 2011 and 2016). 
These concepts are used to define the “idea of automatically analysing textual 
information” (Xing, Cambria and Welsch, 2018).  
NLP is a subdiscipline of Artificial Intelligence (El–Haj et al, 2019b) and refers 
to methods such as, Naïve–Bayes classifications, term weighting and cosine 
similarity. Each one is a machine learning method. Their application is complex 
and hard to replicate across studies, which makes the process to validate their 
accuracy harder than the methods to be presented further – see Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011 and 2016; Xing, Cambria and Welsch, 2018; Lewis and Young, 
2019 and El–Haj et al, 2019b for additional details. 
On the other hand, there is word categorization, which is a dictionary–based 
approach and the most common method to extract tone in Accounting and 
Finance research (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Bag of words – or word 
 6 
categorization – is the method in which words are divided into several categories, 
according to the sentiment they capture. This method has the advantage to be 
easily replicated across papers however, in contrast to some machine–learning 
methods, it does not capture semantics, which means it ignores the sequence of 
words (El–Haj et al, 2019b). 
There are four different lists of words commonly used for Accounting and 
Finance research: Henry (2008), Harvard’s GI (General Inquirer), Diction and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) – also known as LM dictionary. 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) developed a list of words to be applied to 
Accounting and Finance research, with positive, negative and uncertainty 
meaning, after showing that the Harvard IV–4 dictionary – a list of positive and 
negative words created for psychology and sociology – is not appropriate for 
Accounting and Finance discourse since it classifies common words (considering 
this kind of speech) such as “tax” and “liability” as negative. In addition, it does 
not include words with a positive sentiment (and commonly used in financial 
disclosures) such as “strong” and “record” (Henry, 2009). The authors also 
studied Diction dictionaries and found that the software’s word classification is 
not suitable for Accounting and Finance discourse. They applied word lists to 
manager’s writing in 10–K files and found the following, “83% of the Diction 
optimism and 70% of the Diction pessimism frequencies are misclassified, based 
on LM classifications” (Loughran and McDonald, 2015). 
These methods can be applied to “corporate press releases; webpage content; 
analyst reports; (…) pressure groups and politicians; media commentary; and 
speeches by policymakers, regulators and politicians:” (Lewis and Young, 2019). 
In Accounting and Finance research, tone has been shown to be related with stock 
returns, trading volume and earnings. Sentiment and performance’s connection 
has been documented by applying automated content analysis methods to 
analyst reports (Huang, Zang and Zheng, 2014), social media (Kothari, Li and 
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Short, 2009)  and corporate disclosures such as, earnings press releases (Henry, 
2008; Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2011; Price et al, 2012; Zhou, 2014) and  annual 
reports (Li, 2008) or sections on it (Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Li, 2010b; Lo, 
Ramos and Rogo, 2016; Smith and Taffler, 2000).  
Bannier, Pauls and Walter (2017) studied the CEO’s speech at the Annual 
General Meeting from German firms between 2008 and 2016. They developed a 
list of German words based on the lists proposed by Loughran and McDonald 
(2011). Cumulative abnormal returns decreased with the decrease of the 
difference between positive and negative tone.  
Kothari, Li and Short (2009) using word lists from GI, quantified the effects of 
favorable or unfavorable disclosures from MD&A, analyst reports and business 
press, on the cost of capital, return volatility and analyst dispersion from 1996 to 
2001. Considering the aggregated sources, they found that favorable 
(unfavorable) disclosures are associated with a decreasing (increasing) cost of 
capital, stock return volatility and analyst forecast dispersion. For each source of 
disclosure individually, they showed that the MD&A only affects stock return 
volatility, by increasing it, if the tone is unfavorable. This result reflects some 
credibility issues regarding the managers speech. By reacting only to unfavorable 
disclosures, the market is recognizing and acknowledging the existence of 
management bias. Analyst report’s sentiment has no effects on cost of capital. 
The business press carries the same results as the combined sources.  
Li (2010b) analysed forward–looking statements in the MD&A. She manually 
classified sentences as forward–looking and then applied Naïve–Bayes classifier 
to classify those sentences as positive, negative and neutral. She found that 
smaller firms with higher performance, lower accruals and less growth 
opportunities (high book–to–market ratio) have more positive forward–looking 
sentences. 
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In this thesis, the sentiments used to explain the impact of the Brexit 
referendum are extracted from the financial narratives of the companies who 
compose our sample. 
2.2. Financial narratives 
Ingram and Frazier (1983) defined an annual report as “undisguised 
advertisement”. It allows “management to present a serial, annual description of 
corporate financial performance” – Clatworthy and Jones, 2012. There are two 
main parts, the Financial Statements (FS) and the narratives’ sections – hereafter 
mentioned as the narratives. The FS are composed by the balance sheet, the 
income statement, statement of changes of equity, the cash–flow statement and 
the explanatory notes. Their disclosure is mandatory by the IFRS 6  and, in 
contrast, to some parts of the narratives these ones are audited. Even though, 
they allow for corporate financial analysis, they are highly influenced by 
accounting standards and conventions, forecast errors and managers accounting 
choices (Palepu, Healy and Peek, 2013). The Chairman’s statement (also known 
as President’s Letter, Chairman’s Letter or Letter to Shareholders), the 
Management Commentary7 (also known as MD&A or Operating and Financial 
Review), the Governance report, the remuneration review, the audit review and 
a residual commentary, on the other hand, are included in the narratives.  
In contrast, in the US, following the SEC’s (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) terms, firms are required to submit a part of the annual report on 
HTML format, which constitutes the 10–K files. Here, there is a very standardized 
                                                 
6 International Financial Reporting Standards (https://www.ifrs.org/) 
 7 IFRS Practice Statement 1: Management Commentary. “(…) Should be consistent with the following 
principles: Provide management’s view of entity’s performance, position and progress (including forward 
looking information)”. See https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/management-commentary-practice-
statement/ for the complete definition of the Management Commentary. 
It may include one or more sections such as the CEO’s review, a business review or strategic review (Alves 
et al, 2016).  
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format associated with a standard set of headings, that all public firms must 
follow, which “enables more straightforward selection of relevant sections for 
further analysis” (El–Haj, Rayson, Alves and Young, 2018). In addition, the SEC’s 
EDGAR system, allows the extraction of a large sample of files. UK annual 
reports’ lack standardization and are not as easily available. Still, while following 
the requirements imposed by IAS Regulation, UK firms still hold some 
discretionary power regarding content and structure and so, they can choose 
where they present the information in the annual report and the titles for each 
section (El–Haj, Alves, Rayson, Walker and Young, 2019a). This together with the 
fact that in UK, annual reports are published as PDF files represents a major 
obstacle to retrieve and process information, as the first step to analyse the 
narratives involves to automatically determine the structure of the annual report. 
Karthik, Li and Yang (2012) state that financial reporting and voluntary 
disclosure are complementary, since FS represent supportable evidence, while 
the narratives improve the FS’s credibility. Still, the narratives can also be 
subjected to management bias, since there is an opportunity for firms to 
manipulate the market perception of their financial performance or corporate 
accomplishments. Likewise, they can act as proxy for firm performance.  
Merkl–Davies and Brennan (2007) showed that impression management8 is 
one incentive for voluntary narrative disclosures.  Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2011) 
demonstrated that managers use tone management 9  to mislead investor’s 
perception. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) proved that not only companies with 
improving performance present more good news and emphasize them, but also, 
there is a tendency to attribute improving performance on themselves and blame 
the environment in case of bad news. Li (2010a) evidenced the existence of 
                                                 
8 “Impression management, the process by which people control the impressions others form of them” -– 
Leary and Kowalski, 1990. 
9  Tone management is defined by Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2011) as the “choice of the tone level in 
qualitative text that is incommensurate with the concurrent quantitative information”. 
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managerial SAB (self–attribution bias) – managers take responsibility for positive 
results and fault someone or something else for poor results – when she found a 
more recurrent use of first–person pronouns, in MD&A from 10–K files, for 
improving performance. In addition, the author showed that companies with 
lower earnings presented more complex10 annual reports, and the ones associated 
with more persistent positive earnings have annual reports with higher levels of 
readability – they are easier to understand (Li, 2008). Lo, Ramos and Rogo (2016) 
showed that the MD&A section from 10–K files studied from 2000 to 2012 are 
more complex if the firm is more likely to have engaged in earnings management 
to overcome the previous year earnings. 
Still, financial narratives can also be a source of incremental information. For 
instance, Smith and Tafler (2000) found that the chairman’s statement can be a 
predictor for financial distressed firms, “reinforcing the argument that such 
unaudited narrative disclosures contain important information associated with 
the future of the company”.  
Ji, Talavera and Yin (2018) studied the Independent Directors Reports from 
Chinese listed firms from 2004–2012 by applying Naïve–Bayes classifiers. The 
authors found that positive (negative) tone is associated with improving 
(decreasing) firm performance (proxied by abnormal returns).  
Price et al (2012) analysed earnings conference calls from the 4th quarter of 2004 
to the 3rd quarter of 2007 using the GI list of words. The authors showed that the 
tone from quarterly earnings conference calls are a predictor of abnormal returns 
and trading volume. 
                                                 
10 For the mentioned paper, complexity is measured with the Fog index, which tell us the number of years 
of formal education required for an average intelligence person to understand a text collection after reading 
it once. It can be calculated with the following formula: 
Fog index = (words per sentence + proportion of complex words)×0,4 
Words with more than three syllables are defined as complex. High levels of the fog index (more than 14 
years of formal education) indicate for high levels of complexity and low levels of readability. A fog index 
higher than 21 stands for unreadable discourses.  
See Li (2008) for further details. 
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Overall, tone may be positive reflecting good performance, or it may signal 
positive expectations regarding future performance that quantitative disclosures 
do not reflect due to regulation. In both cases, tone is a source of incremental 
information. Nevertheless, it can also represent an attempt for managers to hide 
poor performance, which, in this case, is an example of tone management 
(Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2011). 
Following, we discuss the effects of the Brexit referendum and explain why 
we believe it will affect a company’s financial narratives. 
2.3. The Brexit referendum 
Brexit stands for British exit.  
On June 23rd, 2016 the UK voted to leave the EU. The EU was formally notified 
regarding the UK’s intention to no longer be a member by March 29th, 2017. 
According to Article 50 nº 3 on the Treaty on European Union11, withdrawal 
negotiations may last two years. If the UK and the EU do not reach an agreement 
in that period, the UK will cease to be a member of the EU automatically. 
However, this period may be extended if the remaining EU state members 
unanimously approve. The deadline was set at 31st October 2019 and, until then, 
the UK is a member of the EU. The withdrawal process is still being negotiated. 
When studying the effects of Brexit, literature focuses on the consequences of 
leaving the EU considering two possible scenarios, a Hard Brexit and a Soft 
Brexit. A Soft Brexit is considered an optimistic scenario. It assumes the UK 
remains in the European’s Union single market12, keeping the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and labor. A Hard Brexit means total isolation of the UK. 
                                                 
11 Available at https://eur–lex.europa.eu/legal–content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL&from=EN. 
12 European Economic Area (EEA). By staying in the single market, the UK becomes a non–EU member with 
a similar agreement with the EU like Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. These countries have a free–trade 
agreement with the EU allowing the free trade of goods, services, labor and capital. They still contribute to 
the EU budget. Contributions are not as large as if they were EU members, though (Chang, 2017). 
 12 
Considering this scenario, trades between the UK and the EU are regulated under 
the WTO – World Trade Organization – terms. This is the same as a non–
agreement Brexit. 
In addition, work regarding Brexit also studies the market’s reaction to the 
vote.  
By analysing a firm’s narratives, we want to understand if the effects of the 
Brexit referendum and the expectations towards the consequences of Brexit, are 
reflected and absorbed by the firms that compose our sample. 
2.3.1. The market reaction to the Brexit referendum 
 On June 24th, 2016, the day after the vote, the pound sterling registered its 
higher drop against the US Dollar since 1985. At the end of the day, the market 
closed with a nearly 8% drop in the GBP (see figure 1) while the EUR fell by, 
approximately, 2%. Against the EUR, the GBP reported a similar behavior, 
Exchange rates fell by 6% (see figure 2).  
 
Note: The x–axis is the number of working days before (t<0) or following the Brexit referendum 
(t>0). Day zero is the day of the vote, June 23rd, 2016. The y–axis tells us how many USD 1 GBP 
can buy. Source: Datastream. 
 
Figure 1 – GBP and USD exchange rate around the Brexit vote 
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Note: The x–axis is the number of working days before (t<0) or following the Brexit referendum 
(t>0). Day zero is the day of the vote, June 23rd, 2016. The y–axis tells us how many EUR 1 GBP 
can buy. Source: Datastream. 
 
The index FTSE100, FTSE250 and LSE closed the day with a loss higher than 
3%, 7% and 9% respectively (see figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Growth rate of the indexes around the Brexit vote 
 
Note: The x–axis is the number of working days before (t<0) or following the Brexit 
referendum (t>0). Day zero is the day of the vote, June 23rd, 2016. The y–axis is the growth rate. 
Source: Datastream. 
Figure 2 – GBP and EUR exchange rate around the Brexit vote 
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The credit rating agencies downgraded the UK’s debt rating. Standard & 
Poor’s lowered UK’s credit rating to AA. Fitch ratings changed it from AA+ to 
AA. Moody’s who had previously classified the UK’s debt rating as stable, 
downgraded it to negative (Aristeidis and Elias, 2018; Oehler, Horn and Wendt, 
2017). 
Ramiah et al (2017) showed that the impact of the vote differs between sectors. 
However, most of them registered negative abnormal returns following the 
Brexit referendum. Banking was the most affected one. They also documented 
variations in the short–term systematic risk following the vote.  
Bloom et al (2019) stated that the Brexit referendum started a period of high 
uncertainty. The authors found that nearly 40% of UK companies described 
Brexit as one of the top three causes of uncertainty in the two years following the 
referendum. Also, uncertainty is higher for firms who are more dependent on 
both trades or migrant labor from the EU, such as the ones from Wholesale & 
Retail and the Manufacturing industries. This finding is consistent with Oeher, 
Horn and Wendt (2017) who found that firms with lower levels of 
internationalization diversification – proxied by the weight of domestic sales – 
reported more negative abnormal returns the day following the vote, than the 
ones with high levels of diversification. 
2.3.2. Consequences of Brexit  
Brexit is a major source of uncertainty, particularly towards the potential 
existence of trade barriers, affecting both imports and exports. Uncertainty from 
the possibility of loss of passporting rights13, which may have a significant impact 
                                                 
13 For the UK, having passporting rights allows UK firms to trade services with any country from the EEA 
without the need of authorization from the country it is trading with, it reduces “red tap”. Ramiah et al 
(2017) showed that Banking was the most affected sector following the vote, registering a high drop on 
abnormal returns. This is consistent with the concern to lose passporting rights. Note that, the banking sector 
is responsible to generate 54% of income from financial services trades between the EU and the UK (Armour, 
2017).  
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on services exports. Uncertainty from the regulation of matters that so far were 
of shared or of exclusive competence of the EU, such as agriculture and fishery, 
trade agreements, immigration and financial regulation (Chang, 2017).  
Uncertainty is a major issue because both people and firms do not know what 
to expect. If they do not recognize with a reasonable amount of certainty what is 
to come, they are unable to hedge themselves against future issues.  
Considering this, Dhingra et al (2017) estimated a drop on the consumption of 
UK goods and services per capita by 1.3% and 2.7% with a Soft and Hard Brexit, 
respectively. Leaving the single market is expected to result in a decrease of 
exportations and an increase in the price of importations, due to the imposition 
of trade barriers. Consequently, a drop in UK’s long–term GDP growth rate is 
anticipated. PwC (2016) and OECD (2016) estimated a 3.5% and a 5% decrease, 
respectively. Dhingra et al (2017) predicted more than a 7% drop.  
So far, we have reported potential outcomes resulting from UK leaving the 
EU. Literature identifies both advantages and disadvantages of the Brexit. But 
for the matter of this thesis, the important subject here, is to understand that the 
market’s reaction to the vote suggests a negative sentiment towards Brexit. Yet, 
and as a lot of work highlights, estimates are based on assumptions characterized 
by high uncertainty, that may or may not be accurate and verified in the future, 
since there are so many questions and doubts. Lehmann and Zetzsche (2016) 
stated “(…) The only certainty for now is that it is impossible to predict the exact 
outcome of the negotiation process.” 
This uncertainty and reaction are what we look to capture in our study.  
In addition to the work mentioned throughout the thesis, see Craig (2016) for 
a review of the process to get to the Brexit referendum; Belke, Dubova and 
Osowsi (2018) who studied the consequences of Brexit to the UK and non–UK 
countries; Steinberg (2019) that documented the impact of uncertainty on trade 
policies following the vote;  Driffield and Karoglaw (2018) to understand the 
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effects of Brexit on foreign investment in the UK and Bockli et al (2017) who wrote 
“The Consequences of Brexit for Companies and Company Law”. 
2.4. Research question: the effect of the Brexit vote on a 
firm’s discourse 
Studies show that the annual report and individual sections, such as the 
Chairman’s and MD&A’s, carry predictive ability of a company’s future 
performance. Alves et al (2016) proposed three arguments that support the 
hypothesis that each section carries different predictive ability of firm 
performance, giving strength to the need to perform a simultaneous analysis of 
several annual report sections. First, each section, by definition, has one purpose 
and information may differ depending on the one it belongs to. Second, the 
whole annual report is not written by the same person or team. Furthermore, 
different authors may have a different profile – academic background and 
personality, for instance – which as shown by Argamon et al (2009) is reflected 
on linguistic style. Third, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) showed that preparers’ 
incentives are a determinant of financial reporting quality. Moreover, Osma and 
Guillamón–Saorín (2011) documented that governance mechanisms impact 
management disclosures. Companies with strong governance policies are 
associated with higher quality disclosures.  
Our goal is to understand if a company’s tone and discourse characteristics are 
affected by the Brexit referendum event. Given that, we compare its impact on 
different sentiments and sections. Thus, we not only care to explain tone, but also, 
uncertainty, forward–looking and causality as speech characteristics and 
sentiments in an annual report. Each one is studied for the Chairman’s, the CEO’s 
and the narratives’ sections.  
To test if the Brexit referendum influenced companies, we formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
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H1a) Brexit has a negative impact on tone in the Chairman’s letter. 
H1b) Brexit has a negative impact on tone in the CEO’s review. 
H1c) Brexit has a negative impact on the MD&A’s14 tone.  
Considering the negative effect, the Brexit referendum had on firms’ abnormal 
returns for most sectors (Ramiah et al, 2017), we believe a company’s tone will 
decrease, consequently. These hypotheses are formulated under the assumption 
that tone and firm performance are positively associated, meaning that 
decreasing performance is reflected with a more negative tone. 
H2a) Brexit has a positive impact on the level of uncertainty in the Chairman’s section. 
H2b) Brexit has a positive impact on the level of uncertainty in the CEO’s section.  
H2c) Brexit has a positive impact on the MD&A’s level of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty words are defined as the ones related with the notion of 
imprecision (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). As mentioned throughout the 
thesis, one of the major consequences of the referendum is the uncertainty it 
brought and created for firms in the UK. Given that, we expect the referendum 
to increase the use of uncertainty words on the firm’s annual report.  
Still, we must highlight that literature on the study of uncertainty discourse, 
forward–looking speech and causal reasoning as speech dimensions for 
Accounting and Finance research is sparse and limited. For this reason, this 
assumes an exploratory character.  
H3a)  Brexit has a positive impact on the use of forward–looking words in the 
Chairman’s section. 
H3b) Brexit has a positive impact on the use of forward–looking words in the CEO’s 
section. 
H3c) Brexit has a positive impact on the MD&A’s use of forward–looking words. 
                                                 
14 As mentioned on page 8, the MD&A or Management Commentary, may include several annual report sections’ 
and, as so, it is commonly used to refer to the narratives. Given that, hereinafter when we use the term MD&A we 
are referring to the narratives.   
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Hussainey et al (2003) identified forward–looking words as the ones 
“associated with forecasts and predictions”.  
Although the study of forward–looking discourse undertakes an experimental 
character – and, given that, there is some doubt towards the expected impact of 
the vote on forward–looking discourse – following the work from Bozanic et al 
(2018), we believe the vote has positive effect on forward–looking words. The 
authors found that when uncertainty is high, the issuance of forward–looking 
statements with a non–forecast–like dimension (non–quantitative earnings–
related reports) increases. Furthermore, Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014) 
showed that firms make more disclosures on forward–looking performance – 
measured by an index of reports regarding expected performance – when they 
increase levels of debt or if they are to announce bad news. 
H4a) Brexit has a positive impact on the use of causal words in the Chairman’s section.  
H4b) Brexit has a positive impact on the use of causal words in the CEO’s section. 
H4c) Brexit has a positive impact on the MD&A’s use of causal words. 
Causal words are the ones used when we are explaining or justifying 
something. Zhang and Aerts (2015) stated it is the kind of language used when 
the firm is explaining “why” and “how” of its performance. Their paper studies 
the use of causality words on the Management Commentary, as an impression 
management mechanism firms use when they fail to meet earnings thresholds. 
They found a positive relationship between the use of causal reasoning words 
and not meeting earnings thresholds, “such as positive earnings, earnings change 
and analyst earnings consensus”. Li (2008) found that companies with less 
persistent earnings use causal words more frequently. 
Considering the impact of the Brexit referendum documented related with the 
decrease on cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns, the expectations 
towards the UK’s GDP, the evolution of consumption of UK goods and services, 
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but also UK exports, we believe the use of causal language will become more 
recurrent following the vote. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample selection 
The digital PDF annual reports are processed by the software CFIE–FRSE, 
which generates the dataset of textual analysis. It includes one dummy variable 
(DR_AR_IGNORE) that takes the value one if the annual report classification 
accuracy is questionable. To collect the sample, we drop those observations 
(DR_AR_IGNORE=1) and the ones with no data. Next, we delete the ones prior 
to 2012 and utility firms as well. 
Due to the presence of outliers, we drop the extreme bottom and top one 
percentiles for the following variables: ROA, market value and book–to–market 
ratio. For the returns, earnings yield, change in ROA and ROA and returns 
volatility we only drop the observations above percentile 99.  
Our sample comprises a total of 6,821 annual reports. The number of 
observations varies across annual report section.  
3.2. Research design 
To test our hypotheses, we formulate several OLS regression models. To 
understand the impact of the referendum, first, we regress tone, uncertainty, 
forward–looking and causality on tone determinants and industry–fixed effects 
which control for firm features. Then, we formulate a second regression model 
and add the Brexit indicator variable.  
Each sentiment is regressed for three sections, the CEO’s, the Chairman’s and 
the MD&A’s, according to the hypothesis being tested. 
Tests on our hypotheses focus on estimates of 𝛽14 from the following 
regression model: 
 21 
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠′𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶ℎ_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶ℎ_𝐸𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1 – 12) 
 
Note that, the independent variables are the same regardless of the sentiment 
and annual report section. The only difference among the regression models used 
to test our hypotheses, are the dependent variables, which vary according to the 
sentiment and section.  
The dependent variable for model (1) is the tone of the Chairman’s section 
from the annual report published by firm i in year t; for model (2) is the tone of 
the CEO’s section from the annual report published by firm i in year t; for model 
(3) is the tone of the MD&A from the annual report published by firm i in year t; 
for model (4) is the uncertainty of the Chairman’s section from the annual report 
published by firm i in year t; for model (5) is the uncertainty from the CEO’s 
section, from the annual report published by firm i in year t; for model (6) is the 
uncertainty of the MD&A from the annual report published by firm i in year t; 
for model (7) is the forward–looking of the Chairman’s section from the annual 
report published by firm i in year t; for model (8) is the forward–looking of the 
CEO’s section from the annual report published by firm i in year t; for model (9) 
is the forward-looking of the MD&A from the annual report published by firm i 
in year t; for model (10) is the causal reasoning of the Chairman’s section from 
the annual report published by firm i in year t; for model (11) is the causal 
reasoning of the CEO’s section from the annual report published by firm i in year 
t; for model (12) is the causal reasoning of the MD&A from the annual report 
published by firm i in year t. 
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Following the literature by Li (2008 and 2010) we run panel data regression 
models on tone determinants suggested by the author. ROA and change in ROA 
are proxies for profitability. Market and financial performance are measured by 
the returns, earnings yield and its change. The logarithm of the companies’ equity 
market value controls for firm dimension. The book–to–market ratio is a proxy 
for growth opportunities. The ROA and returns volatility control for operational 
and business risk. Age captures the life cycle of the firm. The number of 
geographic segments and business segments controls for the firm’s operating 
complexity. Loss controls for an event of decreasing earnings yield. 
Apart from the Brexit indicator variable, our models differ from hers, since we 
do not control for special items and firm events (seasoned equity offerings and 
mergers and acquisitions). Also, we add the variables earnings yield and its 
change and dummy variable loss, to control for situations of changes in earnings 
and its decline. Each variable is defined in table 16 in appendix.  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is return on assets of firm i in year t; 𝐶ℎ_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the change in the return 
on assets of firm i in year t; 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the 12–month stock return of firm i in year t; 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the earnings yield of firm i in year t; 𝐶ℎ_𝐸𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the change in 
the earnings yield of firm i in year t; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the logarithm of market 
capitalization at fiscal year–end of firm i in year t; 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the book–to–market 
ratio of firm i in year t;  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  is the returns’ volatility of firm i in year t; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the ROA volatility of firm i in year t; 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the log(1+age) of firm i 
in year t; 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 is the log(1 + number of geographic segments) of firm i in year 
t; 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 is the log(1 + number of business segments) of if firm i in year t; 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 
is the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the EY from firm i in year t is lower 
than zero, or zero otherwise; 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the indicator variable that takes the value 
one if the annual report from firm i is published in 2016 or 2017 and zero 
otherwise. Since the referendum happened in June 2016, we believe this year’s 
annual report can capture its effect, once they are typically disclosed at the end 
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of the year, which makes us believe, firms had time to react to the vote and reflect 
that reaction and expectations in the annual report. 
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4. Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample including both 
financial and non–financial firms.  
The median firm has one geographic and business segments. It has 16 years, a 
market capitalization of 100, a book to market ratio of 0.61; a 12–month stock 
return of 7.5%; an earnings yield of 4.6%; a ROA of 3.6% and both have changes 
of, approximately, 0.6%. It has a return and ROA volatility of, approximately, 
0.08 and 0.07, respectively. Also, the median firm has a positive tone (tone is 
higher than zero) and the CEO’s section is the one with the higher levels (0.42). 
Uncertainty words follow the same pattern, being the CEO’s section the one with 
the highest level (approximately 0.05). Forward–looking discourse is higher for 
the Chairman’s statement (0.02), while causal words are more frequent in the 
narratives (0.01). 
Results are presented as follows. For tone – models (1), (2) and (3) – see table 
2; for uncertainty – models (4), (5) and (6) – see table 5; for forward–looking – 
models (7), (8) and (9) – see table 8; for causal reasoning – models (10), (11) and 
(12) – see table 11.  
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
PANEL A – TONE MEASURES 
Variable name  N Mean St. Dev.  Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
Tone_Chair 5,833 0.2807 0.3050 –1.0000 0.0581 0.3333 0.5152 1.0000 
Tone_CEO 3,155 0.3817 0.2414 –1.0000 0.2500 0.4184 0.5524 1.0000 
Tone_MD&A 6,821 0.0076 0.2047 –1.0000 –0.1507 0.0357 0.1581 0.6091 
Change_Tone 2,686 0.0000 0.1900 –1.0558 –0.1150 0.0076 0.1223 0.7993 
Uncertainty_Chair 5,833 0.0484 0.0158 0.0000 0.0380 0.0479 0.0582 0.1476 
Uncertainty_CEO 3,155 0.0535 0.0161 0.0000 0.0438 0.0539 0.0636 0.2225 
Uncertainty_MD&A 6,821 0.0328 0.0073 0.0000 0.0278 0.0329 0.0377 0.1027 
Change_Uncertainty 2,686 0.0000 0.0136 –0.0590 –0.0085 –0.0006 0.0079 0.7899 
Forwardlooking_Chair 5,833 0.0175 0.0066 0.0000 0.0132 0.0172 0.0216 0.0701 
Forwardlooking_CEO 3,155 0.0150 0.0066 0.0000 0.0106 0.0143 0.0188 0.0636 
Forwardlooking_MD&A 6,821 0.0120 0.0029 0.0000 0.0102 0.0118 0.0136 0.0429 
Change_Forwardlooking 2,686 0.0000 0.0063 –0.0189 –0.0041 –0.0004 0.0039 0.0243 
Causal_Chair 5,833 0.0122 0.0053 0.0000 0.0087 0.0120 0.0153 0.0413 
Causal_CEO 3,155 0.0128 0.0053 0.0000 0.0092 0.0123 0.0159 0.0520 
Causal_MD&A 6,821 0.0138 0.0029 0.0000 0.0120 0.0138 0.0157 0.0367 
Change_Causal 2.686 0.0000 0.0051 –0.0148 –0.0034 –0.0003 0.0029 0.0292 
 
        
         
PANEL B – TONE DETERMINANTS/ FIRM SPECIFICS 
Variable name  N Mean St. Dev.  Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
ROA 6,821 –0.0110 0.2135 –1.7136 –0.0415 0.0360 0.0927 0.3903 
Change ROA 6,821 0.0224 0.3028 –0.8096 –0.0358 0.0056 0.0472 11.8066 
Returns 6,821 0.0983 0.4360 –1.0000 –0.1506 0.0747 0.2966 2.4211 
Earnings Yield 6,821 –0.0237 0.4491 –18.0000 –0.0472 0.0459 0.0942 0.5855 
Change Earnings Yield 6,821 0.0537 1.0341 –32.1786 –0.0338 0.0061 0.0584 43.0127 
Market Value 6,821 959 3,191 1 21 100 505 37,937 
BTM 6,821 0.4282 1.4194 –14.0037 0.2424 0.6102 1.0297 4.2778 
Return Volatility 6,821 0.0995 0.0709 0.0031 0.0514 0.0796 0.1259 0.5068 
ROA Volatility  6,821 0.1332 0.2549 0.0002 0.0283 0.0656 0.1395 3.8501 
Age 6,821 21.4454 14.9918 0.0000 11.0000 16.0000 29.0000 53.0000 
Number geographic seg. 6,821 2.4130 1.9554 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 4.0000 10.0000 
Number business seg. 6,821 2.2466 1.6895 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 10.0000 
Loss 6,821 0.3271 0.4692 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Brexit 6,821 0.3168 0.4653 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
The sample comprises firm–years for firms listed in the London Stock Exchange with fiscal year–ends between January 
2012 and December 2017. Source: market and accounting data is extracted from Datastream. Tone variables belong to the 
dataset available for download at http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/datasets/uk-annual-report-narratives-
dataset-cfiefrse-may-2019(4443e5bd-38c4-45bf-ae96-a7d947e529ce).html 
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4.1. Tone 
Table 2 presents the regression models on tone from the CEO’s, the 
Chairman’s and the MD&A’s sections of the annual report. Each one is shown 
with and without the Brexit indicator variable.  
Table 2 – OLS coefficients estimates of tone 
 Tone   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 1.1   1.2   2.1   2.2   3.1   3.2   
Intercept 0.3232 *** 0.3196 *** 0.3735 *** 0.3694 *** 0.1116 *** 0.1120 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0271   0.0264   0.0254   0.0241   0.0004   0.0005    
(0.2890)  (0.3030)  (0.4130)  (0.4370)  (0.9780)  (0.9720)  
Change ROA –0.0364 *** –0.0365 *** 0.0195   0.0190   –0.0229 *** –0.0228 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.3030)  (0.3180)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
Returns 0.0773 *** 0.0776 *** 0.0540 *** 0.0544 *** 0.0399 *** 0.0399 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Earnings Yield 0.0302 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0397 *** 0.0398 *** 0.0127 ** 0.0127 **  
(0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0050)  (0.0040)  (0.0320)  (0.0320)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0017   –0.0018   –0.0031   –0.0033   –0.0029 ** –0.0029 **  
(0.6850)  (0.6700)  (0.5110)  (0.4830)  (0.0460)  (0.0460)  
Size 0.0238 *** 0.0234 *** 0.0248 *** 0.0244 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0030 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  
BTM –0.0143 *** –0.0136 *** –0.0069   –0.0061   –0.0073 *** –0.0074 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1160)  (0.1720)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Return Volatility 0.1392 ** 0.1375 ** –0.2065 *** –0.2059 *** 0.0016   0.0017    
(0.0250)  (0.0260)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.9670)  (0.9630)  
ROA Volatility 0.0006   0.0011   –0.0147   –0.0146   –0.0232 ** –0.0232 **  
(0.9710)  (0.9430)  (0.4660)  (0.4680)  (0.0140)  (0.0140)  
Age –0.0480 *** –0.0472 *** –0.0298 *** –0.0288 *** –0.0303 *** –0.0304 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
GeoSeg 0.0237 *** 0.0242 *** –0.0126   –0.0124   0.0176 *** 0.0175 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.1440)  (0.1520)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusSeg 0.0758 *** 0.0763 *** 0.0103   0.0105   0.0637 *** 0.0637 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.2520)  (0.2400)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss –0.1118 *** –0.1118 *** –0.0453 *** –0.0459 *** –0.0669 *** –0.0669 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Brexit   0.0091     0.0102     –0.0011    
  (0.1620)    (0.2050)    (0.7830) 
 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
F statistic 229.3100  219.2100  42.8500  41.4500  339.1700  323.7100 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 44.26%  44.28%  24.05%  24.09%  48.38%  48.38% 
 
N 5,833   5,833   3,155   3,155   6,821   6,821   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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Brexit seems to not explain tone as H1a, H1b and H1c are rejected. The indicator 
variable has no statistical significance. We identify two reasons to explain this 
result. Firstly, companies do not react to the vote, suggesting it has no effect on 
their expectations of future performance. We find this unlikely considering the 
results to be presented further and literature on the market reaction to the vote. 
Secondly, firms do not identify a positive or negative dimension in result of the 
Brexit referendum. This finding is consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis. 
Since companies are unable to identify which scenario will result from the Brexit 
event, they do not attribute a positive or negative sentiment to the vote, which 
explains why the Brexit variable adds no value (to the regression model without 
the Brexit dummy variable) when explaining tone. Note that, the scenario in 
which the UK leaves the EU has a major impact on companies. In addition, the 
reaction to the vote varies significantly across industry.  
Bouoiyour and Selmi (2018) showed that Financial and Technology firms 
reported stronger stock price declines as a reaction to the referendum than 
industries such as Consumer Goods and Oil and Gas. Even though, all industries 
studied reacted negatively to the vote, these last two were much less sensible. 
Furthermore, with the sterling depreciation exports are expected to become 
cheaper (ceteris paribus), explaining why Consumer Goods do not react as badly 
(as Technology and Financial firms). Oil and Gas companies trade mostly in US 
Dollars and for that reason, are considered in this scenario, as “safe haven” 
(Bouoiyour and Selmi, 2018). Knowing this, and once our sample includes those 
industries, we conduct this analysis on financial and non–financial firms traded 
in the LSE. We chose to analyse the financial industry individually due to its 
importance in the UK and the studies suggesting it was one of the most affected 
industry by the referendum. In 2018, the financial sector accounted for 7% of 
UK’s GDP and 23% of all services exports in the UK, which, in 2017, 43% of those 
were to EU countries (Rhodes, 2019). Tables 17 and 18 in appendix present the 
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descriptive statistics of non-financial and financial firms, respectively. Our 
results are presented on the tables 3 and 4. 
While the tone from financial firms is not explained by the Brexit referendum, 
the tone from non–financial companies became more positive following the vote.  
Before discussing these results, we must highlight that our sample is 
composed by traded firms on the LSE, not necessarily firms based in the UK. 
These firms may react positively as they identify the possibility to win market 
share by the UK exit from the EU. 
Note that, while one sample only includes financial firms, the other is a 
diversified sample, including seven different industries – Basic Materials, 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Healthcare, Industrials, Oil and Gas, 
Technology and Telecommunications – which may explain the positive tone 
following the referendum.  
Last of all, Bouoiyour and Selmi (2018) also concluded that when firms 
announced projects related with product diversification, abnormal returns 
become positive. In exception to Consumer Goods firms’, this was reported for 
all sectors in–sample. At least 25% of our sample of non–financial institutions is 
composed by firms with geographic segments – proxy for diversification – 
between 4 and 10. This means the impact of Brexit, even if negative, it is lower 
for these firms. In contrast, only 5% of financial firms have, at least, 4 geographic 
segments, which shows this sample has a much lower weight of diversified 
companies (when compared to non–financial firms). The ones with less 
diversification – less than 4 geographic segments (95%) – are more exposed to the 
potential consequences from Brexit, which, consequently, explains the results 
obtained.  
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Table 3 – Non–financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of tone 
 Tone   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 1.1   1.2   2.1   2.2   3.1   3.2   
Intercept 0,4375 *** 0,4325 *** 0,4096 *** 0,4036 *** 0,2073 *** 0,2064 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
ROA 0,0606 ** 0,0605 ** 0,0283   0,0267   0,0062   0,0061    
(0,0280)  (0,0290)  (0,3800)  (0,4090)  (0,6940)  (0,7010)  
Change ROA –0,0380 *** –0,0382 *** 0,0224   0,0215   –0,0193 *** –0,0193 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,2430)  (0,2620)  (0,0090)  (0,0080)  
Returns 0,0806 *** 0,0807 *** 0,0555 *** 0,0556 *** 0,0429 *** 0,0429 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
Earnings Yield 0,0273 ** 0,0271 ** 0,0449 *** 0,0452 *** 0,0154 ** 0,0154 **  
(0,0170)  (0,0180)  (0,0040)  (0,0040)  (0,0170)  (0,0180)  
Change Earnings Yield 0,0003   0,0002   –0,0033   –0,0036   –0,0017   –0,0018    
(0,9320)  (0,9650)  (0,4780)  (0,4300)  (0,3600)  (0,3520)  
Size 0,0239 *** 0,0235 *** 0,0226 *** 0,0221 *** 0,0035 *** 0,0034 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0050)  (0,0060)  
BTM –0,0067 ** –0,0058 * –0,0033   –0,0020   –0,0022   –0,0020    
(0,0300)  (0,0640)  (0,4600)  (0,6550)  (0,2210)  (0,2640)  
Return Volatility –0,2109 *** –0,2117 *** –0,3088 *** –0,3067 *** –0,2318 *** –0,2319 ***  
(0,0020)  (0,0020)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
ROA Volatility 0,0206   0,0215   –0,0205   –0,0200   –0,0174   –0,0173    
(0,2360)  (0,2140)  (0,3700)  (0,3800)  (0,1140)  (0,1160)  
Age –0,0404 *** –0,0392 *** –0,0249 *** –0,0233 *** –0,0329 *** –0,0326 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
GeoSeg 0,0057   0,0062   –0,0032   –0,0030   0,0086 * 0,0087 *  
(0,4630)  (0,4240)  (0,7180)  (0,7330)  (0,0660)  (0,0650)  
BusSeg –0,0036   –0,0034   –0,0207 ** –0,0208 ** 0,0126 ** 0,0126 **  
(0,6600)  (0,6770)  (0,0280)  (0,0280)  (0,0100)  (0,0100)  
Loss –0,0837 *** –0,0838 *** –0,0393 *** –0,0404 *** –0,0618 *** –0,0619 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0030)  (0,0020)  (0,0000)  (0,0000) 
 
Brexit 
  0,0126 *   0,0154 *   0,0023    
  (0,0900) 
 
  (0,0550) 
 
  (0,5960) 
 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
F statistic 64,6300  61,6100  35,3700  34,2800  68,1900  64,9000 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 27,50%  27,55%  23,31%  23,41%  25,10%  25,10% 
 
N 3,826   3,826   2,588   2,588   4,525   4,525   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01.
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Table 4 – Financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates 
   Tone    
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 1.1   1.2   2.1   2.2   3.1   3.2   
Intercept –0.1712 *** –0.1765 *** 0.0777   0.0809   –0.3111 *** –0.3092 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.2760)  (0.2620)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0865   0.0820   0.0045   0.0046   0.0520   0.0536    
(0.2580)  (0.2860)  (0.9760)  (0.9750)  (0.2350)  (0.2230)  
Change ROA –0.0518   –0.0521   –0.0337   –0.0331   –0.0604 ** –0.0605 **  
(0.2560)  (0.2560)  (0.8240)  (0.8260)  (0.0240)  (0.0230)  
Returns 0.0606 ** 0.0623 ** 0.0491   0.0475   0.0260 * 0.0254 *  
(0.0230)  (0.0200)  (0.1080)  (0.1380)  (0.0900)  (0.0980)  
Earnings Yield 0.0419 *** 0.0418 *** –0.0038   –0.0028   0.0090   0.0090    
(0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.9450)  (0.9590)  (0.5450)  (0.5440)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0164   –0.0164   0.0158   0.0155   –0.0035 * –0.0035 *  
(0.2120)  (0.2140)  (0.4270)  (0.4390)  (0.0630)  (0.0620)  
Size 0.0167 *** 0.0162 *** 0.0296 *** 0.0299 *** –0.0016   –0.0014    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.4610)  (0.5230)  
BTM –0.0198 *** –0.0189 *** –0.0160   –0.0166   –0.0125 *** –0.0128 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.1970)  (0.1910)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Return Volatility 1.0455 *** 1.0393 *** 0.4517   0.4555   0.6634 *** 0.6654 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1480)  (0.1460)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA Volatility –0.0525   –0.0516   0.0552   0.0557   –0.0476 *** –0.0479 ***  
(0.1220)  (0.1290)  (0.2340)  (0.2300)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  
Age –0.0382 *** –0.0373 *** –0.0358 ** –0.0362 ** –0.0096 * –0.0099 *  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0280)  (0.0270)  (0.0780)  (0.0700)  
GeoSeg 0.0524 *** 0.0534 *** –0.0407   –0.0414   0.0307 *** 0.0304 ***  
(0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.1180)  (0.1220)  (0.0050)  (0.0060)  
BusSeg 0.2288 *** 0.2298 *** 0.1069 *** 0.1061 *** 0.1629 *** 0.1625 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss –0.1429 *** –0.1427 *** –0.0907 ** –0.0909 ** –0.0733 *** –0.0734 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0140)  (0.0140)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Brexit 
  0.0095     –0.0059     –0.0036    
  (0.4180)     (0.8190)    (0.6110) 
 
F statistic 73.6300  68.4400  8.5000  7.8900  66.1700  61.6200 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 32.53%  32.56%  16.02%  16.03%  27.57%  27.58% 
 
N 2,007   2,007   567   567   2,296   2,296   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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4.2. Uncertainty 
Table 5 presents the regression models on uncertainty language from the 
CEO’s, the Chairman’s and the MD&A’s sections of the annual report. Each one 
is shown with and without the Brexit indicator variable.  
Table 5 – OLS coefficients estimates of uncertainty 
 Uncertainty   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 4.1   4.2   5.4   5.5   6.1   6.2   
Intercept 0.0477 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0397 *** 0.0391 *** 0.0299 *** 0.0294 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0038 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0018   0.0016   0.0003   0.0002    
(0.0050)  (0.0060)  (0.2890)  (0.3410)  (0.5830)  (0.7450)  
Change ROA –0.0014 *** –0.0014 *** 0.0000   –0.0001   –0.0006 ** –0.0006 ***  
(0.0040)  (0.0030)  (0.9740)  (0.9570)  (0.0110)  (0.0080)  
Returns 0.0028 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0016 ** 0.0017 ** 0.0008 *** –0.0001    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0230)  (0.0190)  (0.0000)  (0.7780)  
Earnings Yield 0.0011 * 0.0011 * 0.0004   0.0004   0.0000   –0.0001    
(0.0520)  (0.0570)  (0.5070)  (0.4860)  (0.8300)  (0.3640)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0003   –0.0003   –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0001   0.0009 ***  
(0.1810)  (0.1550)  (0.6060)  (0.4640)  (0.4560)  (0.0000)  
Size 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0008 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0008 *** –0.0007 *** –0.0008 *** –0.0007 *** –0.0005 *** –0.0004 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0030)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Returns Volatility –0.0019   –0.0021   –0.0071   –0.0071   0.0015   0.0013    
(0.5980)  (0.5510)  (0.1480)  (0.1540)  (0.3290)  (0.3890)  
ROA Volatility 0.0000   0.0001   –0.0036 *** –0.0036 *** –0.0007 ** –0.0007 *  
(0.9810)  (0.9340)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0490)  (0.0600)  
Age –0.0019 *** –0.0018 *** –0.0014 *** –0.0012 *** –0.0011 *** –0.0010 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.0030)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
GeoSeg 0.0021 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0017 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusSeg 0.0034 *** 0.0035 *** 0.0009   0.0010 * 0.0020 *** 0.0020 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1070)  (0.0950)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss –0.0041 *** –0.0041 *** –0.0020 *** –0.0021 *** –0.0013 *** –0.0013 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0060)  (0.0040)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Brexit   0.0013 ***   0.0015 ***   0.0011 ***  
  (0.0010)    (0.0070)    (0.0000)  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F statistic 86.7100  83.8600  44.0000  43.0200  139.3700  137.4300  
Adjusted 𝑅2 23.89%  24.03%  22.67%  22.84%  28.84%  29.33%  
N 5,833   5,833   3,155   3,155   6,821   6,821   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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Results seem to indicate that the vote led to an increase on the use of 
uncertainty words for the sections studied, which is consistent with our 
expectations and confirms H2a, H2b and H2c. Brexit is a source of uncertainty 
and, as a result, annual reports from 2016 and 2017 show a more recurrent use of 
imprecision–related words than the ones from 2012 to 2015. See tables 6 and 7 for 
the results on non–financial and financial firms.  
Tests on those companies document the same results. On the matter of 
uncertainty, there is no difference between financial and non–financial firms and 
across annual report sections. Note that, only the CEO’s section from a financial 
firm reports a Brexit indicator variable with no statistical significance. This is also 
reported for the sentiments presented further, which can be explained by the lack 
of observations on this specific section.  
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Table 6 – Non–financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of uncertainty 
 Uncertainty   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 
4.1   4.2   5.4   5.5   6.1   6.2   
Intercept 0.0515 *** 0.0510 *** 0.0405 *** 0.0398 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0326 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0036 ** 0.0036 ** 0.0017   0.0015   0.0003   0.0002    
(0.0170)  (0.0180)  (0.3390)  (0.3950)  (0.6150)  (0.7210)  
Change ROA –0.0015 *** –0.0015 *** 0.0001   0.0000   –0.0007 *** –0.0008 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.9430)  (0.9780)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
Returns 0.0033 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0001    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0090)  (0.0090)  (0.0000)  (0.7160)  
Earnings Yield 0.0013 * 0.0013 * 0.0002   0.0002   0.0001   0.0001    
(0.0520)  (0.0560)  (0.7670)  (0.7290)  (0.6540)  (0.5060)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0001   0.0001   0.0010 ***  
(0.7290)  (0.6730)  (0.6620)  (0.4780)  (0.4070)  (0.0000)  
Size 0.0012 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0008 *** –0.0007 *** –0.0008 *** –0.0007 ** –0.0004 *** –0.0003 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0030)  (0.0150)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  
Returns Volatility –0.0107 *** –0.0108 *** –0.0125 ** –0.0123 ** –0.0055 *** –0.0056 ***  
(0.0090)  (0.0080)  (0.0210)  (0.0230)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ROA Volatility –0.0004   –0.0003   –0.0040 *** –0.0039 *** –0.0008 * –0.0007 *  
(0.6700)  (0.7430)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0560)  (0.0720)  
Age –0.0024 *** –0.0023 *** –0.0008 * –0.0007   –0.0012 *** –0.0010 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0740)  (0.1540)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
GeoSeg 0.0018 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0015 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusSeg 0.0019 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0002   0.0002   0.0008 *** 0.0009 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.7750)  (0.7840)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss –0.0039 *** –0.0039 *** –0.0016 ** –0.0017 ** –0.0012 *** –0.0012 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0460)  (0.0320)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
Brexit 
  0.0012 **   0.0017 ***   0.0014 ***  
  (0.0180) 
 
  (0.0050) 
 
  (0.0000) 
 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
F statistic 56.7900  54.7000  38.0700  37.1800  69.8200  69.7400 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 20.47%  20.58%  22.25%  22.47%  22.80%  23.60% 
 
N 3,826   3,826   2,588   2,588   4,525   4,525   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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Table 7 – Financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of uncertainty 
 Uncertainty   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 
4.1   4.2   5.4   5.5   6.1   6.2   
Intercept 0.0313 *** 0.0304 *** 0.0375 *** 0.0374 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0207 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0066 * 0.0059   0.0008   0.0008   0.0018   0.0015    
(0.0610)  (0.7500)  (0.7550)  (0.7540)  (0.7590)  (0.7640)  
Change ROA –0.0007   –0.0007   –0.0018   –0.0019   –0.0004   –0.0003    
(0.7620)  (0.7500)  (0.7550)  (0.7540)  (0.7590)  (0.7640)  
Returns 0.0002   0.0005   –0.0013   –0.0012   0.0002   –0.0003    
(0.8910)  (0.7140)  (0.3720)  (0.4150)  (0.7320)  (0.4740)  
Earnings Yield 0.0014 * 0.0014 * 0.0046 * 0.0045 * –0.0003   –0.0003 **  
(0.0530)  (0.0530)  (0.0510)  (0.0530)  (0.4770)  (0.0160)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0012 * –0.0012 * 0.0000   0.0000   –0.0003 ** 0.0003    
(0.0740)  (0.0770)  (0.9780)  (0.9690)  (0.0150)  (0.6120)  
Size 0.0009 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0010 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0006 ** –0.0005 * –0.0010 ** –0.0010 ** –0.0006 *** –0.0006 ***  
(0.0220)  (0.0890)  (0.0210)  (0.0270)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Returns Volatility 0.0243 *** 0.0232 *** 0.0244 ** 0.0243 ** 0.0189 *** 0.0186 ***  
(0.0030)  (0.0040)  (0.0460)  (0.0480)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA Volatility 0.0001   0.0002   –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0006   –0.0006    
(0.9700)  (0.8770)  (0.9670)  (0.9610)  (0.3770)  (0.4160)  
Age –0.0006   –0.0004   –0.0031 *** –0.0031 *** –0.0007 *** –0.0006 ***  
(0.2110)  (0.3780)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.0020)  
GeoSeg 0.0029 *** 0.0031 *** 0.0024 * 0.0024 * 0.0022 *** 0.0022 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0580)  (0.0600)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusSeg 0.0069 *** 0.0071 *** 0.0030 ** 0.0030 ** 0.0040 *** 0.0041 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0120)  (0.0120)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss –0.0042 *** –0.0042 *** –0.0036 * –0.0036 * –0.0013 *** –0.0013 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0510)  (0.0520)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
Brexit 
  0.0017 ***   0.0002     0.0006 ***  
  (0.0060)     (0.8810)    (0.0000) 
 
F statistic 28.1800  26.8100  28.0900  26.0900  76.1900  71.3600 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 16.05%  16.36%  26.31%  26.32%  28.16%  28.31% 
 
N 2,007   2,007   567   567   2,296   2,296   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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4.3. Forward–looking 
Table 8 presents the regression models on the forward-looking language from 
the CEO’s, the Chairman’s and the MD&A’s sections of the annual report. Each 
one is shown with and without the Brexit indicator variable.  
Table 8 – OLS coefficients estimates of forward–looking 
 Forward–looking   
 Chairman  CEO   MD&A   
 7.1   7.2  8.1   8.2   9.1   9.2   
Intercept 0.0168 *** 0.0167 *** 0.0150 *** 0.0151 *** 0.0107 *** 0.0106 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0014 * 0.0014 * –0.0005   –0.0005   0.0004   0.0004    
(0.0500)  (0.0540)  (0.5260)  (0.5400)  (0.1490)  (0.1760)  
Change ROA –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0002   –0.0002   0.0004 ** 0.0004 **  
(0.8220)  (0.8100)  (0.6000)  (0.6100)  (0.0210)  (0.0230)  
Returns –0.0002   –0.0002   –0.0005   –0.0005   –0.0002 * –0.0002 *  
(0.2710)  (0.2880)  (0.1030)  (0.1010)  (0.0580)  (0.0650)  
Earnings Yield 0.0004 * 0.0004 * 0.0006 ** 0.0006 ** –0.0002 ** –0.0002 **  
(0.0890)  (0.0940)  (0.0330)  (0.0340)  (0.0300)  (0.0290)  
Change Earnings Yield 0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.8590)  (0.8400)  (0.4070)  (0.3950)  (0.1430)  (0.1240)  
Size –0.0001 *** –0.0001 *** 0.0001   0.0001   0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***  
(0.0090)  (0.0050)  (0.1120)  (0.1020)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0001   –0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   –0.0001 *** –0.0001 **  
(0.1830)  (0.3110)  (0.3300)  (0.3920)  (0.0010)  (0.0100)  
Returns Volatility 0.0010   0.0009   0.0035   0.0035   0.0017 ** 0.0017 **  
(0.5490)  (0.5720)  (0.1120)  (0.1130)  (0.0160)  (0.0180)  
ROA Volatility 0.0001   0.0001   –0.0007   –0.0007   0.0002   0.0002    
(0.8010)  (0.7680)  (0.1740)  (0.1730)  (0.4010)  (0.3800)  
Age 0.0001   0.0002   –0.0004 *** –0.0005 *** –0.0002 *** –0.0001 **  
(0.3020)  (0.2180)  (0.0080)  (0.0060)  (0.0020)  (0.0100)  
GeoSeg –0.0004 * –0.0004 * –0.0008 *** –0.0008 *** –0.0003 *** –0.0003 ***  
(0.0700)  (0.0840)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  
BusSeg –0.0007 *** –0.0007 *** 0.0000   0.0000   –0.0004 *** –0.0004 ***  
(0.0020)  (0.0020)  (1.0000)  (0.9900)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss 0.0008 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0009 ** 0.0009 ** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***  
(0.0070)  (0.0070)  (0.0190)  (0.0180)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Brexit   0.0003     –0.0001     0.0002 ***  
  (0.1040)    (0.6000)    (0.0010)  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F statistic 7.8400  7.5900  11.7200  11.2300  27.6200  26.7500  
Adjusted 𝑅2 2.79%  2.84%  8.05%  8.06%  8.67%  8.80%  
N 5,833   5,833   3,155   3,155   6,821   6,821   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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Like the use of uncertainty words, the vote also has a positive effect on the use 
of forward–looking words on the MD&A from the annual reports from the year 
of the vote – 2016 – and the year after – 2017, however only H3c is accepted. 
This finding is consistent with our expectations but also, with literature that 
suggests that periods of high uncertainty lead to an increase in the issuance of 
forward–looking statements. Such reports are the ones related with future 
performance (Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014) as the Management 
Commentary – or MD&A –, which may be the reason why Brexit does not explain 
forward–looking discourse on the Chairman’s and CEO’s section. This latter 
section (when it exists) can be included in the Management Commentary. By only 
analysing it, we are studying just a part of the Management Commentary. The 
narratives, on the other hand, cover all sections including other forward–looking 
statements, such as the ones studied by Athanasakou and Hussainey (2014).  
Following, we present results on non–financial (table 9) and financial institutions 
(table 10). 
While the uncertainty of financial and non–financial firms individually, 
reported similar results to the ones documented on the sample including both, 
this is not as straightforward on forward–looking discourse. 
Results on non–financial firms suggest both the Chairman and the MD&A 
adopt a more recurrent forward–looking language. On the other hand, the Brexit 
variable on financial firms has no statistical significance on any section.  Still, the 
Brexit estimates with statistical significance load with a positive and expected 
coefficient, allowing us to draw the same conclusions, which is a sign of robust 
and consistent results. 
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Table 9 – Non–financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of forward–looking 
 Forward–looking   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 
7.1   7.2   8.1   8.2   9.1   9.2   
Intercept 0.0165 *** 0.0163 *** 0.0151 *** 0.0152 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0100 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0005   0.0005   –0.0005   –0.0005   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.5040)  (0.5070)  (0.5620)  (0.5770)  (0.9550)  (0.9080)  
Change ROA –0.0003   –0.0003   –0.0004   –0.0004   0.0004 ** 0.0004 **  
(0.5030)  (0.4980)  (0.4390)  (0.4490)  (0.0270)  (0.0290)  
Returns –0.0004   –0.0004   –0.0005   –0.0005   –0.0003 *** –0.0003 ***  
(0.1390)  (0.1420)  (0.1210)  (0.1210)  (0.0060)  (0.0060)  
Earnings Yield 0.0003   0.0003   0.0005   0.0005   –0.0001 ** –0.0002 **  
(0.2600)  (0.2740)  (0.1340)  (0.1360)  (0.0470)  (0.0460)  
Change Earnings Yield 0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.6180)  (0.6460)  (0.3080)  (0.2940)  (0.4140)  (0.4980)  
Size –0.0001   –0.0001 * 0.0001   0.0001   0.0004 *** 0.0004 ***  
(0.1640)  (0.0970)  (0.1550)  (0.1390)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0001   –0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   –0.0001 ** –0.0001    
(0.2020)  (0.3790)  (0.7490)  (0.8380)  (0.0310)  (0.1210)  
Returns Volatility 0.0034 * 0.0034 * 0.0033   0.0032   0.0022 *** 0.0021 ***  
(0.0650)  (0.0670)  (0.1630)  (0.1670)  (0.0060)  (0.0070)  
ROA Volatility –0.0004   –0.0004   –0.0008   –0.0008   –0.0001   –0.0001    
(0.3400)  (0.3840)  (0.1890)  (0.1860)  (0.6550)  (0.6990)  
Age –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0004 ** –0.0005 ** –0.0002 ** –0.0001 *  
(0.4310)  (0.6160)  (0.0220)  (0.0190)  (0.0260)  (0.0780)  
GeoSeg –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0007 ** –0.0007 ** –0.0003 *** –0.0003 ***  
(0.6220)  (0.6830)  (0.0100)  (0.0100)  (0.0020)  (0.0030)  
BusSeg –0.0005 * –0.0005 * –0.0002   –0.0002   –0.0005 *** –0.0005 ***  
(0.0690)  (0.0740)  (0.5720)  (0.5730)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss 0.0006 * 0.0006 * 0.0008 ** 0.0008 ** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***  
(0.0790)  (0.0820)  (0.0440)  (0.0420)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
Brexit 
  0.0005 **   –0.0002     0.0003 ***  
  (0.0350) 
 
  (0.5580) 
 
  (0.0020) 
 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
F statistic 5.7200  5.6600  11.8100  11.3000  26.6100  25.6300 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 3.00%  3.11%  9.04%  9.05%  10.49%  10.66% 
 
N 3,826   3,826   2,588   2,588   4,525   4,525   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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Table 10 – Financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of forward–looking 
 Forward–looking   
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
  7.1   7.2   8.1   8.2   9.1   9.2   
Intercept 0.0189 *** 0.0190 *** 0.0152 *** 0.0152 *** 0.0120 *** 0.0119 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0035 ** 0.0036 ** –0.0028   –0.0028   0.0024 *** 0.0023 ***  
(0.0430)  (0.0410)  (0.5810)  (0.5810)  (0.0040)  (0.0060)  
Change ROA 0.0021 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0039   0.0039   –0.0002   –0.0002    
(0.0070)  (0.0070)  (0.2210)  (0.2210)  (0.6580)  (0.6610)  
Returns 0.0000   0.0000   –0.0006   –0.0005   0.0000   0.0001    
(0.9910)  (0.9630)  (0.5240)  (0.5390)  (0.9020)  (0.8360)  
Earnings Yield 0.0011 ** 0.0011 ** 0.0023   0.0023   –0.0002   –0.0002    
(0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.2500)  (0.2490)  (0.2720)  (0.2760)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0013 *** –0.0013 *** –0.0006   –0.0006   –0.0001 *** –0.0001 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.3210)  (0.3220)  (0.0080)  (0.0080)  
Size –0.0002 ** –0.0002 ** 0.0001   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.0120)  (0.0160)  (0.5400)  (0.5620)  (0.7370)  (0.9220)  
BTM –0.0002   –0.0002   0.0003   0.0003   –0.0001 ** –0.0001 **  
(0.1880)  (0.1630)  (0.1940)  (0.1960)  (0.0170)  (0.0400)  
Returns Volatility –0.0095 ** –0.0094 ** 0.0045   0.0044   0.0009   0.0009    
(0.0130)  (0.0140)  (0.5380)  (0.5390)  (0.5570)  (0.5930)  
ROA Volatility 0.0013   0.0013   –0.0002   –0.0002   0.0008   0.0008    
(0.1730)  (0.1760)  (0.8640)  (0.8630)  (0.1360)  (0.1350)  
Age 0.0004 ** 0.0004 * –0.0005   –0.0005   –0.0002 *** –0.0002 **  
(0.0400)  (0.0500)  (0.1960)  (0.1990)  (0.0090)  (0.0160)  
GeoSeg –0.0009 ** –0.0009 ** –0.0011 ** –0.0011 ** –0.0005 *** –0.0005 ***  
(0.0280)  (0.0260)  (0.0440)  (0.0470)  (0.0040)  (0.0050)  
BusSeg –0.0004   –0.0004   0.0005   0.0005   0.0001   0.0001    
(0.3020)  (0.2860)  (0.3580)  (0.3610)  (0.4450)  (0.3960)  
Loss 0.0014 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0013   0.0013   0.0005 *** 0.0006 ***  
(0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.2200)  (0.2200)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  
Brexit 
  –0.0001     0.0000     0.0001    
  (0.6520)     (0.9790)    (0.2030) 
 
F statistic 7.0300  6.5500  1.2300  1.1500  3.9100  3.8900 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 3.94%  3.95%  3.14%  3.14%  2.70%  2.76% 
 
N 2,007   2,007   567   567   2,296   2,296   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01 
.
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4.4. Causality 
Table 11 presents the regression models on causal reasoning language from 
the CEO’s, the Chairman’s and the MD&A’s sections of the annual report. Each 
one is shown with and without the Brexit indicator variable.  
Table 11 – OLS coefficients estimates of causality 
 Causal    
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
 10.1   10.2   11.1   11.2   12.1   12.2   
Intercept 0,0120 *** 0,0119 *** 0,0120 *** 0,0119 *** 0,0110 *** 0,0107 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
ROA 0,0016 *** 0,0016 *** 0,0016 ** 0,0016 ** 0,0012 *** 0,0011 ***  
(0,0010)  (0,0020)  (0,0190)  (0,0240)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
Change ROA –0,0011 ** –0,0011 ** –0,0011 *** –0,0011 *** –0,0002 ** –0,0003 **  
(0,0160)  (0,0140)  (0,0020)  (0,0020)  (0,0160)  (0,0120)  
Returns –0,0006 *** –0,0006 *** –0,0006 ** –0,0006 ** –0,0004 *** –0,0004 ***  
(0,0030)  (0,0040)  (0,0100)  (0,0120)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
Earnings Yield –0,0005   –0,0005   –0,0005 * –0,0005 * –0,0004 *** –0,0004 ***  
(0,5210)  (0,4800)  (0,0730)  (0,0730)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
Change Earnings Yield 0,0002   0,0002   0,0002 * 0,0002 * 0,0000 * 0,0000    
(0,6100)  (0,6550)  (0,0540)  (0,0670)  (0,0720)  (0,1290)  
Size –0,0002 *** –0,0002 *** –0,0002 *** –0,0002 *** 0,0004 *** 0,0004 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0010)  (0,0010)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
BTM 0,0001   0,0002   0,0001   0,0002 * –0,0001 *** 0,0000    
(0,6530)  (0,9470)  (0,1900)  (0,0940)  (0,0030)  (0,2140)  
Returns Volatility 0,0006   0,0006   0,0006   0,0006   0,0016 ** 0,0015 **  
(0,9300)  (0,8740)  (0,7280)  (0,7180)  (0,0160)  (0,0230)  
ROA Volatility –0,0006 *** –0,0006 *** –0,0006   –0,0006   –0,0008 *** –0,0008 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,1410)  (0,1460)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
Age 0,0003 ** 0,0003 *** 0,0003 ** 0,0003 ** 0,0000   0,0000    
(0,0240)  (0,0070)  (0,0310)  (0,0150)  (0,7240)  (0,3580)  
GeoSeg 0,0006 *** 0,0006 *** 0,0006 *** 0,0006 *** 0,0008 *** 0,0008 ***  
(0,0000)  (0,0000)  (0,0020)  (0,0020)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
BusSeg 0,0000   0,0000   0,0000   0,0000   0,0004 *** 0,0004 ***  
(0,3890)  (0,3170)  (0,8820)  (0,8470)  (0,0000)  (0,0000)  
Loss 0,0000 * 0,0000 * 0,0000   0,0000   0,0002 ** 0,0002 **  
(0,0540)  (0,0520)  (0,9720)  (0,9130)  (0,0180)  (0,0200)  
Brexit   0,0004 ***   0,0004 **   0,0007 ***  
  (0,0000)    (0,0430)    (0,0000)  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F statistic 10,0900  10,3900  5,3300  5,3300  86,5400  88,7000  
Adjusted 𝑅2 3,74%  3,94%  3,12%  3,24%  20,23%  21,31%  
N 5833   5833   3155   3155   6821   6821   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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The Brexit indicator variable loads with a positive coefficient. Consistent with 
our expectations the vote led firms to use causal words more recurrently and thus 
hypothesis H4a, H4b and H4c are accepted. 
Financial and non–financial firms report similar results. Both document an 
increase in the use of causal words following the referendum. However, similarly 
to the forward–looking regression models’, the coefficient of the Brexit indicator 
variable from the CEO’s section of financial firms is not significant. Yet, the 
results with statistical significance are aligned with our prospects. Following the 
vote, both financial and non–financial firms applied a more explanatory and 
justifying kind of speech. This is consistent with our results and the literature that 
suggests the use of causal words to be negatively associated with performance, a 
relationship we document as well, as the returns – a proxy of market and 
financial performance – share with causality a negative association. 
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Table 12 – Non–financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of causality  
 Causality    
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
  10.1   10.2   11.1   11.2   12.1   12.2   
Intercept 0.0120 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0115 *** 0.0113 *** 0.0111 *** 0.0108 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0019 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0017 ** 0.0016 ** 0.0015 *** 0.0014 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0210)  (0.0250)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Change ROA –0.0004 ** –0.0004 ** –0.0010 *** –0.0011 *** –0.0002 ** –0.0002 **  
(0.0310)  (0.0300)  (0.0030)  (0.0020)  (0.0410)  (0.0330)  
Returns –0.0005 ** –0.0005 ** –0.0005 ** –0.0005 * –0.0004 *** –0.0004 ***  
(0.0180)  (0.0190)  (0.0490)  (0.0500)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Earnings Yield –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0005 * –0.0005 * –0.0004 *** –0.0004 ***  
(0.7450)  (0.7070)  (0.0870)  (0.0890)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Change Earnings Yield 0.0000   0.0000   0.0002 *** 0.0002 ** 0.0001   0.0000    
(0.5950)  (0.6470)  (0.0080)  (0.0120)  (0.1090)  (0.1950)  
Size –0.0004 *** –0.0004 *** –0.0002 *** –0.0002 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0003 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0030)  (0.0020)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0001   0.0000   0.0002   0.0002 * 0.0000   0.0000    
(0.5430)  (0.8720)  (0.1380)  (0.0710)  (0.3000)  (0.6810)  
Returns Volatility 0.0005   0.0005   –0.0003   –0.0002   0.0003   0.0002    
(0.7330)  (0.7490)  (0.8860)  (0.9080)  (0.7140)  (0.7470)  
ROA Volatility –0.0012 *** –0.0011 *** –0.0003   –0.0003   –0.0006 *** –0.0006 ***  
(0.0040)  (0.0050)  (0.5150)  (0.5350)  (0.0020)  (0.0030)  
Age 0.0004 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***  
(0.0010)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
GeoSeg 0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusSeg 0.0002   0.0002   –0.0001   –0.0001   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.2760)  (0.2570)  (0.6480)  (0.6420)  (0.9210)  (0.8160)  
Loss 0.0002   0.0002   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***  
(0.4070)  (0.4220)  (0.3780)  (0.4240)  (0.0050)  (0.0090) 
 
Brexit 
  0.0006 ***   0.0004 *   0.0008 ***  
  (0.0020) 
 
  (0.0660) 
 
  (0.0000) 
 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
 
F statistic 9.1400  9.3700  6.0500  6.0000  56.8400  59.3300 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 4.92%  5.14%  3.95%  4.07%  19.49%  20.84% 
 
N 3,826   3,826   2,588   2,588   4,525   4,525   
 P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01
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Table 13 – Financial firms: OLS coefficients estimates of causality 
 Causal    
 Chairman   CEO   MD&A   
  10.1   10.2   11.1   11.2   12.1   12.2   
Intercept 0.0133 *** 0.0131 *** 0.0152 *** 0.0150 *** 0.0109 *** 0.0106 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
ROA 0.0016   0.0014   0.0032   0.0031   0.0007   0.0005    
(0.3120)  (0.3750)  (0.2410)  (0.2450)  (0.2870)  (0.4760)  
Change ROA –0.0005   –0.0005   –0.0017   –0.0017   –0.0004   –0.0003    
(0.5100)  (0.4960)  (0.5100)  (0.5020)  (0.3150)  (0.3220)  
Returns –0.0009 * –0.0009 * –0.0015 ** –0.0014 * –0.0007 *** –0.0006 **  
(0.0600)  (0.0830)  (0.0320)  (0.0550)  (0.0040)  (0.0120)  
Earnings Yield –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0003   –0.0003   –0.0002   –0.0002    
(0.7330)  (0.7270)  (0.8260)  (0.7860)  (0.2410)  (0.2330)  
Change Earnings Yield 0.0000   0.0000   –0.0005   –0.0005   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.8830)  (0.8890)  (0.2740)  (0.2970)  (0.5900)  (0.6280)  
Size –0.0001   –0.0001   –0.0002   –0.0002   0.0005 *** 0.0004 ***  
(0.1770)  (0.1020)  (0.1230)  (0.1070)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM 0.0000   0.0000   –0.0001   0.0000   –0.0002 *** –0.0001 **  
(0.9980)  (0.7790)  (0.7540)  (0.8960)  (0.0010)  (0.0200)  
Returns Volatility –0.0029   –0.0031   0.0056   0.0053   0.0045 *** 0.0042 ***  
(0.3620)  (0.3220)  (0.3290)  (0.3550)  (0.0040)  (0.0060)  
ROA Volatility –0.0016 ** –0.0015 ** –0.0021 * –0.0021 * –0.0010 *** –0.0010 ***  
(0.0350)  (0.0380)  (0.0640)  (0.0590)  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  
Age –0.0002   –0.0002   –0.0006 ** –0.0006 ** –0.0005 *** –0.0004 ***  
(0.2590)  (0.3680)  (0.0370)  (0.0450)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
GeoSeg 0.0009 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0005   0.0005   0.0010 *** 0.0010 ***  
(0.0090)  (0.0070)  (0.3280)  (0.2970)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BusSeg –0.0002   –0.0001   0.0004   0.0004   0.0009 *** 0.0009 ***  
(0.6230)  (0.7180)  (0.4360)  (0.3870)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Loss 0.0007 ** 0.0008 ** –0.0010   –0.0010   0.0001   0.0001    
(0.0490)  (0.0460)  (0.2130)  (0.2190)  (0.7700)  (0.7080)  
Brexit 
  0.0004 *   0.0004     0.0005 ***  
  (0.0970)     (0.4630)    (0.0000) 
 
F statistic 2.3800  2.4100  1.8600  1.7300  42.6700  41.8200 
 
Adjusted 𝑅2 1.49%  1.63%  3.78%  3.89%  21.36%  22.09% 
 
N 2,007   2,007   567   567   2,296   2,296   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
4.5. Further analysis 
Alves et al (2016) captured inconsistency in performance–related narratives. 
Our models differ from theirs, since we capture inconsistency in the CEO’s 
section (while they used the business review, instead) and Chairman’s discourse.   
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We capture discourse inconsistencies for tone, uncertainty, forward–looking 
and causality, by regressing the Chairman’s speech on the CEO’s discourse. The 
inconsistency is captured by the error term of each model – 𝜇𝑖𝑡. The error term 
captures everything related with the Chairman speech that is not explained by 
the CEO’s discourse – see table 14 and equation 13. 
𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠′ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠′ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
(13-16) 
Table 14 – Regression models that capture discourse inconsistencies 
  Tone_Chair Uncertainty_Chair Forwardlooking_Chair Causal_Chair 
Intercept 0.2305 *** 0.0326 *** 0.0135 *** 0.0093 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
Tone_CEO 0.5024 ***       
 (0.0000)        
Uncertainty_CEO   0.3893 ***     
   (0.0000)      
Forwardlooking_CEO     0.2333 ***   
     (0.0000)    
Causal_CEO       0.1977 *** 
       (0.0000)  
F statistic 638.4100 219.2300  143.2300  82.1800  
Adjusted  𝑅2 27.74% 
 
17.01%  5.75%  3.99%  
N 2,686   2,686   2,686   2,686  
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
 
After capturing inconsistency – the residuals from the models shown in table 
14 –, we regress it on tone determinants (identified in chapter 2), the Brexit 
dummy and industry indicator variables – equation 17.  
𝐶ℎ_𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠′ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶ℎ_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶ℎ_𝐸𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(17-20) 
If the error term of the model of tone inconsistency is lower than zero, we 
expect the CEO is being optimistic, presenting a more positive discourse than the 
Chairman. On the contrary, if the error term is higher than zero, the CEO is being 
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pessimist, presenting a more negative, or less positive discourse than the 
Chairman. Both describe discourse inconsistencies’. However, our analysis 
focuses on the situations when CEO’s are optimistic.  
We expect managers to be optimistic and to use more uncertainty, forward–
looking and causality words (than the Chairman) if they belong to firms with 
poor market and financial performance, which is proxied by the variable 
earnings yield, change in earnings yield, returns and loss. These variables are 
expected to load with a positive coefficient. Loss, on the other hand, with a 
negative one. 
Variables are defined in table 16. Tone determinants and Brexit dummy 
variable keep the same interpretation as defined in Chapter 3 and table 16.  
The median firm reports a positive change in tone, while the changes in 
uncertainty, forward–looking and causal words are negative. This suggests the 
CEO from the median firm applies a more uncertain, forward–looking and causal 
discourse than the Chairman. 
Results are presented as follows (table 15). 
Brexit loads with a positive and significant coefficient on tone, uncertainty and 
forward–looking language, suggesting the CEO’s discourse after the referendum 
became less positive and applied less uncertainty and forward-looking words 
than the Chairman. In addition, we can also infer on the influence of firm features 
on optimism. The CEO uses a more positive and uncertain language (than the 
Chairman) if the firm is more mature and reports poor market and financial 
performance. On the contrary, he/she uses more causal reasoning words when 
performance increases. Regarding the use of forward–looking words, we can 
only infer the CEO uses these words more recurrently if it belongs to a larger firm 
with increasing profitability and decreasing performance. 
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Table 15 – Discourse inconsistencies 
 
Discourse Inconsistencies  
  Change_Tone Change_Uncertainty Change_Forwardlooking Change_Causality 
Intercept 0.0447   0.0052 ** –0.0008   0.0004    
(0.1990)  (0.0310)  (0.5220)  (0.6120)  
ROA 0.0226   0.0055 ** 0.0019   0.0029 ***  
(0.4720)  (0.0240)  (0.1210)  (0.0010)  
Change ROA 0.0322   –0.0030   –0.0023 ** –0.0014    
(0.3520)  (0.1810)  (0.0380)  (0.1430)  
Returns 0.0414 *** 0.0028 *** 0.0001   –0.0008 ***  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.8560)  (0.0030)  
Earnings Yield 0.0371 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0002   –0.0005 *  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.6420)  (0.0970)  
Change Earnings Yield –0.0052   –0.0003   0.0003 *** 0.0001    
(0.1080)  (0.2940)  (0.0010)  (0.2060)  
Size 0.0012   –0.0003 * –0.0003 *** –0.0003 ***  
(0.5840)  (0.0950)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
BTM –0.0035   –0.0001   0.0000   0.0000    
(0.5440)  (0.7960)  (0.8010)  (0.9170)  
Returns Volatility –0.0741   –0.0062   0.0028   0.0002    
(0.3120)  (0.2130)  (0.2530)  (0.9180)  
ROA Volatility 0.0596 *** 0.0006   –0.0003   –0.0012 **  
(0.0030)  (0.5910)  (0.6460)  (0.0200)  
Age –0.0110 ** –0.0012 *** 0.0002   0.0003 **  
(0.0300)  (0.0030)  (0.2960)  (0.0280)  
GeoSeg –0.0048   0.0004   0.0000   0.0004 **  
(0.5290)  (0.4570)  (0.8790)  (0.0460)  
BusSeg –0.0066   0.0006   –0.0001   0.0003    
(0.4020)  (0.3030)  (0.8460)  (0.1690)  
Loss –0.0600 *** –0.0020 ** 0.0006   0.0005    
(0.0000)  (0.0170)  (0.1680)  (0.1540)  
Brexit 0.0127 * 0.0015 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0003    
(0.0960)  (0.0060)  (0.0050)  (0.1450)  
Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
F statistic 10.6300  8.9900  4.5500  4.6800  
Adjusted 𝑅2 8.03%  6.53%  3.37%  3.95%  
N 2,686   2,686   2,686   2,686   
P–values reported in parentheses are computed using the robust standard errors to obtain unbiased OLS coefficients. 
OLS coefficients estimates and its p–values in parentheses. *p–value < 0.1; **p–value < 0.05; ***p–value < 0.01. 
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5. Conclusions 
We examine the effects of the Brexit referendum on companies’ financial 
discourse by studying the CEO’s, the Chairman’s and the MD&A’s sections. Not 
only we analyse tone, but also the use of uncertainty, forward–looking and causal 
words.  
Results show companies reacted to the vote. We compare the period following 
the referendum by studying annual reports published in 2016 and 2017 with the 
ones from 2012 to 2015. We conduct an analysis on a sample comprising 6,821 
annual reports, including both financial and non–financial institutions. While 
tone is not explained by the vote, uncertainty, forward–looking and causal 
reasoning words are more frequent and positively associated with the vote. 
To test our results’ consistency and robustness we divide our sample between 
financial and non–financial companies. Only tone reports different results. The 
tone from financial firms is not explained by the vote. Non–financial firms, on 
the other hand, adopt a more positive discourse. 
Even though our main objective is to understand the effects of the referendum 
on our companies’ financial narratives, we also study which firm dimension 
influences each sentiment. The tone determinants used, control for profitability, 
market and financial performance, size, growth opportunities, operational and 
business risk, firm’s operating complexity and we also add industry fixed - 
effects in models including non–financial companies. Both tone and uncertainty 
share a positive relationship with market and financial performance – the 
variable returns reports a positive and significant coefficient - and are negatively 
associated with profitability – change in ROA reports a negative and significant 
coefficient. These results suggest firms adopt a more positive but uncertain 
discourse when returns increase and changes in ROA are lower. Forward–
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looking carries opposite results depending on the annual report section. While, 
the CEO and Chairman use these words more frequently when performance 
increases – positive and significant coefficient of the earnings yield – the MD&A 
is negatively associated with performance. Causal reasoning is also negatively 
associated with performance – proxied here by the returns.  
Last of all, we also study discourse inconsistencies on the CEO’s discourse. 
Following the referendum, the CEO became less positive and used less 
uncertainty forward-looking and causal words than the Chairman. Also, as 
expected, the CEO adopts a more positive and uncertainty language when firms’ 
performance deteriorates. On the contrary, the CEO adopts a discourse with 
more causal words (than the Chairman) when performance increases and 
profitability decreases. 
Our study faces some limitations, though. For instance, the CEO’s section 
often reports a Brexit coefficient with no statistical significance. We believe this 
happens due to fewer observations on this section. 
Furthermore, determination coefficients from forward–looking and causal 
language are significantly lower than the ones reported in tone and uncertainty 
regression models’. This is evidence that tone determinants, Brexit and industry 
controls are very limited on explaining these kinds of language.  
Knowing this, we recommend future researchers to conduct studies on the 
incremental predictive power of the abnormal sentiment, which is everything 
that firm’s dimensions do not explain. Likewise, to study these sentiments 
around the financial crisis period, looking for a connection between this period, 
(when many companies faced financial distress situations), and those sentiments.  
In addition, we also recommend researchers to include a variable indicating if 
a firm is based in the UK or not. Being based or traded in the UK, for the matter 
of this thesis, may have a significant impact on the results. After controlling for 
tone determinants, Brexit and industry level, one would expect a UK–based firm 
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to react negatively to the referendum. Non–financial firms reacted positively, 
though. Not being based in the UK is a possible explanation for such result.  
Yet, most results reflect our expectations and robustness tests confirm their 
consistency.
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7. Appendix 
Table 16 – Variables definition.  
Variable name  Definition 
Tone_Chair Chairman’s section: Net tone: The difference between the number of positive and 
negative words scaled by their sum.  Words are defined as positive and negative 
according to Loughran and McDonald's list 
Tone_CEO CEO review: Net Tone:  The difference between the number of positive and 
negative words scaled by their sum.  Words are defined as positive and negative 
according to Loughran and McDonald's list 
Tone_MD&A MD&A: Net tone: The difference between the number of positive and negative 
words scaled by their sum.  Words are defined as positive and negative according 
to Loughran and McDonald's lists 
Change_Tone Tone inconsistencies’ 
Uncertainty_Chair Chairman’s section: number of uncertainty words proposed by Loughran and 
McDonald words list 
Uncertainty_CEO CEO review: number of uncertainty words proposed by Loughran and McDonald 
words list 
Uncertainty_MD&A MD&A: number of uncertainty words proposed by Loughran and McDonald 
words list 
Change_Uncertainty Uncertainty inconsistencies’ 
Forwardlooking_Chair Chairman’s section: number of forward–looking words from an updated version 
of the list of words proposed by Hussainey et al (2003) 
Forwardlooking_CEO CEO review: number of forward–looking words from an updated version of the 
list of words proposed by Hussainey et al (2003) 
Forwardlooking_MD&A MD&A: number of forward–looking words from an updated version of the list of 
words proposed by Hussainey et al (2003) 
Change_Forwardlooking Forward-looking inconsistencies’ 
Causal_Chair Chairman’s section: number of causal reasoning words in performance 
commentary, based on a composite wordlist 
Causal_CEO CEO review: number of causal reasoning words in performance commentary, 
based on a composite wordlist 
Causal_MD&A MD&A: number of causal reasoning words in performance commentary, based 
on a composite wordlist 
Change_ Causal Causality inconsistencies’ 
ROA Return on assets: net income from accounting scaled by lagged total assets 
Change_ROA Change in return on assets: net income change (the difference between the current 
year and the previous one) scaled by lagged total assets 
Return 12–month raw stock return ending four months after the fiscal year–end 
Earnings Yield Earnings per share scaled by lagged stock price 
Change Earnings Yield Change in earnings yield: earnings per share variation (the difference between the 
current year and the previous one) scaled by lagged stock price 
Market value Market value of equity at fiscal year–end 
Size Log (market value) 
BTM Book to market ratio: Firm's book value scaled by its market value 
Return Volatility Standard deviation over the last 12 months before year end 
ROA Volatility  Standard deviation of ROA over the last five years 
Age Log (Age) 
GeoSeg Log (1+ number of geographic segments) 
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BusSeg Log (1+ number of business segments) 
Loss Indicator variable that takes the value one if the earnings yield is lower than zero 
in the current year and zero otherwise 
Brexit Indicator variable that takes take value one if year is 2016 or 2017 and zero 
otherwise  
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Table 17 – Descriptive statistics: non–financial firms 
PANEL A – TONE MEASURES 
Variable name  N Mean St. Dev.  Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
Tone_Chair 3,826 0.3935 0.2500 –1.0000 0.2609 0.4286 0.5660 1.0000 
Tone_CEO 2,588 0.4078 0.2233 –1.0000 0.2886 0.4409 0.5652 1.0000 
Tone_MD&A 4,525 0.0939 0.1600 –1.0000 0.0043 0.1054 0.1957 0.6091 
Uncertainty_Chair 3,826 0.0514 0.0162 0.0000 0.0411 0.0512 0.0614 0.1476 
Uncertainty_CEO 2,588 0.0541 0.0163 0.0000 0.0444 0.0541 0.0641 0.2225 
Uncertainty_MD&A 4,525 0.0343 0.0070 0.0000 0.0301 0.0346 0.0388 0.1027 
Forwardlooking_Chair 3,826 0.0172 0.0067 0.0000 0.0128 0.0169 0.0213 0.0701 
Forwardlooking_CEO 2,588 0.0151 0.0067 0.0000 0.0106 0.0143 0.0190 0.0636 
Forwardlooking_MD&A 4,525 0.0123 0.0030 0.0000 0.0104 0.0122 0.0140 0.0429 
Causal_Chair 3,826 0.0121 0.0055 0.0000 0.0084 0.0117 0.0153 0.0413 
Causal_CEO 2,588 0.0127 0.0053 0.0000 0.0091 0.0122 0.0158 0.0520 
Causal_MD&A 4,525 0.0141 0.0029 0.0000 0.0123 0.0143 0.0161 0.0367 
 
        
 
        
PANEL B – TONE DETERMINANTS/ FIRM SPECIFICS 
Variable name  N Mean St. Dev.  Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
ROA 4,525 –0.0419 0.2366 –1.7136 –0.0757 0.0295 0.0787 0.3851 
Change ROA 4,525 0.0210 0.3446 –0.8096 –0.0334 0.0049 0.0375 11.8066 
Returns 4,525 0.0919 0.4918 –1.0000 –0.2328 0.0474 0.3432 2.4211 
Earnings Yield 4,525 –0.0496 0.4536 –18.0000 –0.0700 0.0340 0.0750 0.5855 
Change Earnings Yield 4,525 0.0582 1.0229 –32.1786 –0.0250 0.0050 0.0406 31.9562 
Market Value 4,525 1,014 3,216 1  17 87 529 36,275 
BTM 4,525 0.2711 1.4799 –14.0037 0.1692 0.4357 0.8079 4.2383 
Return Volatility 4,525 0.1184 0.0731 0.0069 0.0679 0.0981 0.1478 0.5068 
ROA Volatility  4,525 0.1417 0.2803 0.0015 0.0255 0.0570 0.1392 3.8501 
Age 4,525 21.2756 15.1496 0.0000 11.0000 16.0000 29.0000 53.0000 
Number geographic seg. 4,525 2.8979 2.0462 1.0000 1.0000 2.0000 4.0000 10.0000 
Number business seg. 4,525 2.5171 1.7001 1.0000 1.0000 2.0000 4.0000 10.0000 
Loss 4,525 0.3708 0.4831 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Brexit 4,525 0.3165 0.4651 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 18 – Descriptive statistics: financial firms 
PANEL A – TONE MEASURES 
Variable name  N Mean St. Dev.  Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
Tone_Chair 2,007 0.0655 0.2840 –1.0000 –0.1313 0.0286 0.2564 1.0000 
Tone_CEO 567 0.2628 0.2820 –1.0000 0.1111 0.3065 0.4654 1.0000 
Tone_MD&A 2,296 –0.1624 0.1744 –1.0000 –0.2814 –0.1975 –0.0482 0.4702 
Uncertainty_Chair 2,007 0.0428 0.0133 0.0000 0.0342 0.0419 0.0512 0.0967 
Uncertainty_CEO 567 0.0510 0.0151 0.0048 0.0412 0.0525 0.0611 0.0935 
Uncertainty_MD&A 2,296 0.0299 0.0069 0.0000 0.0253 0.0290 0.0341 0.0552 
Forwardlooking_Chair 2,007 0.0180 0.0062 0.0000 0.0139 0.0179 0.0221 0.0438 
Forwardlooking_CEO 567 0.0145 0.0061 0.0000 0.0107 0.0141 0.0183 0.0416 
Forwardlooking_MD&A 2,296 0.0114 0.0026 0.0000 0.0099 0.0113 0.0128 0.0268 
Causal_Chair 2,007 0.0126 0.0048 0.0000 0.0095 0.0124 0.0153 0.0377 
Causal_CEO 567 0.0131 0.0055 0.0000 0.0093 0.0125 0.0164 0.0385 
Causal_MD&A 2,296 0.0132 0.0027 0.0000 0.0116 0.0131 0.0147 0.0248 
 
        
 
        
PANEL B – TONE DETERMINANTS/ FIRM SPECIFICS 
Variable name  N Mean St. Dev.  Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
ROA 2,296 0.0500 0.1398 –0.9975 0.0013 0.0521 0.1197 0.3903 
Change ROA 2,296 0.0251 0.1959 –0.6705 –0.0417 0.0080 0.0784 4.7547 
Returns 2,296 0.1109 0.2963 –1.0000 –0.0247 0.0946 0.2403 2.2419 
Earnings Yield 2,296 0.0273 0.4357 –9.0000 0.0038 0.0743 0.1508 0.5613 
Change Earnings Yield 2,296 0.0449 1.0562 –13.3263 –0.0604 0.0116 0.1111 43.0127 
Market Value 2,296 849 3,138 1 32 123 452 37,937 
BTM 2,296 0.7377 1.2350 –11.2024 0.6799 0.9975 1.1229 4.2778 
Return Volatility 2,296 0.0621 0.0480 0.0031 0.0334 0.0492 0.0749 0.4779 
ROA Volatility  2,296 0.1165 0.1943 0.0002 0.0378 0.0813 0.1399 3.7890 
Age 2,296 21.7801 14.6733 1.0000 11.0000 17.0000 27.0000 53.0000 
Number geographic seg. 2,296 1.4573 1.3159 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 10.0000 
Number business seg. 2,296 1.7134 1.5350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 10.0000 
Loss 2,296 0.2409 0.4277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Brexit 2,296 0.3175 0.4656 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
